The stationary sunspot equilibria of a simple one good OLG economy are considered. These equilibria are known to be suboptimal. We show that, for any such equilibrium allocation, there always exists a Pareto optimal improvement which has the additional property of reaching the Golden Rule in finite time, i.e., the monetary steady state acts as a target. We also show that, in general, periodic allocations cannot be used as targets. The result is interpreted as a welfare theoretical justification for stabilization policy.
Introduction
Recent results show that a simple one good overlapping generations economy (OLG) with deterministic characteristics can exhibit stationary sunspot fluctuations (see, e.g., Azariadis [1]). Following Cass and Shell [3] , these are rational expectations equilibria in which uncertainty matters only because agents believe that it does even though it does not affect preferences and endowments; in addition, prices and allocations are random and depend on only the current realization of the exogenous signal. These equilibria occur in large numbers and, under a standard criterion of efficiency, they are suboptimal.
There is a growing literature dealing with the issue of"stabilizing" these sunspot equilibria (Grandmont [13], and [14] , Woodford [-17] , and the recent Symposium in Economic Theory [9] ). The objective in these papers is to specify policies which lead to a determinate and deterministic equilibrium, thus eliminating Stationary * This paper is based on my dissertation at SUNY Stony Brook. I would like to thank my supervisor, T.J. Muench, for his advice and encouragement. O. Galor's comments on a previous draft, and discussions with M. Kurz, J. Peck, H.M. Polemarchakis, B. Smith, and I. Zilcha, are gratefully acknowledged. Comments from F. Marhuenda, two referees and, especially, the Co-Editor, M. Woodford, did much to improve the exposition. Thanks are due to the Lady Davis Foundation for supporting my stay at the Hebrew University, and the IVIE and DGICYT PB92-0342 at Alicante, where successive drafts were prepared. Sunspot Equilibria (SSE).I A remarkable property of many of these policies is that, if they are announced before any trading takes place, and if they are credible, then intervention is never actually required; however, the policy induced allocation need be neither Pareto optimal nor need it improve over the SSE allocation. Hence, even though the policies in these papers have some appealing properties, like nonintervention, it is not clear that they are desirable in terms of their welfare implications.
In this paper, our focus is on allocations which are Pareto optimal improvements over the SSE allocation, and on the extent of intervention required by the policies which induce these allocations. We postulate that the economy is already in an SSE and prove the existence of allocations that i) Pareto improve over the expected utility from the SSE, conditional on the state in the decision period, ii) that are also Pareto optimal, and iii) that use the Golden Rule allocation as a "target" which is reached in a finite number of periods. The last property implies that these allocations can be supported as equilibria by policies which require intervention in a finite number of periods, since the Golden Rule allocation can be supported by a constant money supply.
We also show that, in general, deterministic cycles (which, like the Golden Rule, are stationary Pareto optimal allocations supported by a constant money supply) cannot play the role of targets for optimal improving allocations in a sunspot environment. In other words, for many economies, the objective of inducing an allocation which is a Pareto improvement over the SSE allocation, leads to the conclusion that no "new" deterministic fluctuations will be introduced by policy makers.
Taken together, our results imply that, for a robust class of economies, any policy that induces a Pareto optimal improvement, satisfying a minimal regularity property, over the SSE allocation, and which does not require monitoring the economy forever, must be a policy that treats the Golden Rule allocation as a target to be reached in finite time. 2 These results show a new and important property of the Golden Rule, and we interpret them as a rigorous welfare justification for "stabilization" policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the economy, its perfect foresight equilibria, and the existence and welfare properties of SSE, and concludes with a restatement of the policy problem. Some preliminary results are presented in Section 3 while our Theorem, together with an alternative optimal improvement, are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 the possibility of treating periodic allocations are targets is considered and the last section concludes.
1 In our framework, the government is in a position to affect the allocations that agents receive by exercising its right to argument or tax away fiat money, or make interest payments on money balances held. A policy consists of a sequence of such taxes (subsidies) and interest rates, and generates a corresponding sequence of money supplies. A policy will be said to be interventionist in a period if the money supply in that period is not the same as the money supply in the previous period. 2 The regularity condition rules out allocations that are non-stationary in every subsequence of periods. It is desirable to impose such a condition since with it the information on marginal rates of substitution (MRS) required for implementing the allocation is "finite".
